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Abstract
This paper contributes to a growing literature on leaders in international politics by explaining
why and how the background experiences of leaders influence nuclear proliferation. Given nuclear
weapons’ crucial role in world politics, examining the importance of leaders for nuclear proliferation
represents a key development in research on leaders. We argue that leaders with a particular
experience – participation in a rebellion against the state – are more likely than their non-rebel
counterparts to pursue nuclear weapons. Former rebels are aware of the contingency of their rule
and more likely to value weapons that could bolster national independence. Drawing on a new
dataset on leader participation in rebel activities, we analyze 1,322 leaders in office from 1945
to 2000. The results strongly support our theory, even when accounting for leader selection. Our
findings underscore the value in using leaders – not just states – as a unit of analysis in international
relations research.
The United States maintained a strict containment regime against Iraq in the 1990s and then
invaded the country in 2003, in part, because of concerns about the spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). A critical assumption underlying American policy was that there was a link
between the leader of the country, Saddam Hussein, and Iraq’s pursuit of WMD – particularly
nuclear weapons. Many in Washington believed that Saddam was the driving force behind Iraq’s
purported nuclear weapons program and that Iraq would no longer covet the bomb if he could
be removed from power. President Bill Clinton expressed this viewpoint when he plainly said in
February 1998, “Do I think [Iraq] would be better served if it had a different leader? Of course I
do” (Gellman & Walsh 1998).
The case of Iraq – despite all of its controversies and complexities – underscores that the beliefs
and experiences of individual leaders matter for international politics, particularly when it comes
to understanding the pursuit of military technologies that can improve national security such as
nuclear weapons. Yet standard political science explanations for how and why nuclear weapons
spread downplay or ignore the role of leaders. The classic realist argument, for example, suggests
that states pursue nuclear weapons when they face external security threats (e.g., Waltz 1990; Paul
2000). Leaders are irrelevant, according to this line of thinking, because individuals will make
similar choices when presented with the same structural conditions. Other prominent theories –
including those that emphasize international institutions and norms (e.g., Dai 2002; Rublee 2009),
alliances (e.g., Frankel 1993), or knowledge and technology diffusion (e.g., Fuhrmann 2012) – likewise
assume that leaders have little effect on nuclear proliferation dynamics. Even arguments centering
on domestic politics largely overlook the beliefs and backgrounds of leaders, focusing instead on a
state’s political institutions (e.g., Singh & Way 2004; Jo & Gartzke 2007; Way & Weeks 2012).
In this article, we theorize that leaders with a particular type of background experience – namely,
participation in a rebellion against the state – are significantly more likely to pursue nuclear weapons
once in office than other types of leaders. Former rebels place a special emphasis on ensuring national
independence and discount the utility of external alliances to provide for their security, making the
pursuit of advanced military technologies more likely. Such leaders also tend to underestimate the
financial and political costs of building the bomb, creating the perception that nuclear weapons
programs are likely to succeed.
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We test our argument using a sample of 1,322 leaders from 1945 to 2000 that is constructed with
existing data on nuclear proliferation and a new dataset on leader participation in rebel activities.
The results reveal a strong and significant correlation between leaders with prior rebel backgrounds
and the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Prior rebels are 542 percent more likely than non-rebels to
pursue nuclear weapons, all other things being equal. One potential concern is that this relationship
reflects an endogenous selection process whereby the countries that are most likely to produce
leaders with prior rebel experience are also systematically more likely to pursue nuclear weapons.
Yet, our analysis controls for this possibility by accounting for irregular entry into office, civil
war, regime type, and other variables that might enable rebels to come to power. Moreover, our
main finding holds when we use country fixed effects, matching analysis, and a series of other
robustness tests designed to isolate the background experiences of leaders from various country-
related circumstances. Although establishing causation using observational data can be challenging,
this evidence strongly favors our theory that there is a non-spurious relationship between rebel
experience and nuclear proliferation.
Our analysis speaks to two enduring debates in political science. First, since the publication of
Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State, and War (1959), scholars in international relations have discussed
which level of analysis – the individual, the state, or the system – allows us to best understand
political phenomena. The overwhelming majority of research focuses on the state or the system,
but we contribute to ongoing efforts to develop leader-centric explanations by showing how the
background experiences of individuals affect a critical national security issue. Second, understanding
the factors that motivate states to build nuclear weapons has been a central issue in international
relations since their debut in 1945. Scholarly interest in nuclear proliferation is surging in light of
the ongoing crises in Iran and North Korea, as evidenced by the sheer number of recent books and
articles on the subject. At the same time, we still lack a complete understanding of how and why
nuclear weapons spread. We offer a novel theory of nuclear proliferation that sheds new light on
this important issue.
We proceed by explaining why a focus on leaders can enhance our understanding of proliferation
dynamics. Next, we introduce our theory about how rebel experience affects leaders’ propensities to
pursue nuclear weapons. We then describe the new data we utilize to test this argument and present
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the statistical results, showing that our findings hold whether one uses simple bivariate comparisons
or multivariate regression analysis. In the penultimate section, we discuss potential objections, and
our conclusion follows.
Leaders and Nuclear Weapons: Does a Link Exist?
The study of leaders in international relations has grown significantly over the last several years.
While some research places more causal weight on the way that institutions influence leaders, rather
than the other way around (e.g., Debs & Goemans 2010; Chiozza & Goemans 2011; Croco 2011), an
increasing number of scholars have shown that leaders themselves play a vital role in determining
national policy. Life experiences prior to when a leader assumes office constitute a testing bed for
leaders when they later consider the strategies that are most likely to succeed (Jervis 1976). Prior
life experiences influence everything from how leaders evaluate the costs and benefits of particular
actions to whether they consider particular options in the first place (Goldgeier 1994; Sechser 2004;
Roberts et al. 2003; Matthews 1954). Recent research shows that revolutionary leaders shape
national behavior (Colgan 2010, 2013), that leaders influence the intervention strategies countries
pursue (Saunders 2011), and that the efficacy beliefs of leaders drive their decisions (Kennedy 2011).
Building on this small but growing literature, we argue that leaders’ background experiences affect
nuclear proliferation. Why might this be the case?
When deciding whether to build nuclear weapons, countries must grapple with a multitude
of potential costs and benefits. Many scholars believe that nuclear weapons provide political and
strategic benefits to their possessors (e.g., Waltz 1990; Beardsley & Asal 2009; Narang 2009). Most
notably, nuclear weapons constitute a form of “invasion insurance.” States with the ability to
retaliate in a violent conflict by using the bomb are seen as less vulnerable to invasion. Yet, on the
down side, nuclear weapons programs are exorbitantly expensive and they can result in diplomatic
isolation and economic sanctions, especially if the proliferator is party to the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) (e.g., Singh & Way 2004; Jo & Gartzke 2007). States that pursue the bomb may also
face preventive military strikes against their nuclear facilities, as the cases of Iraq in 1981 and Syria
in 2007 illustrate (Reiter 2006).
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Compounding matters further, building an independent nuclear arsenal is not the only way for
a country to enhance its security. Many states instead rely on security guarantees from a nuclear-
armed ally. Because nuclear alliances serve as a substitute for developing an indigenous nuclear
arsenal, states that are protected by a “nuclear umbrella” may have less of a need to build their
own nuclear bombs (Frankel 1993). For example, the extension of the American nuclear umbrella
over Japan dissuaded it from the pursuit of nuclear weapons (Sagan 1996). A critical decision point
comes when a country has to decide whether it can provide for its own security without a nuclear
weapons program, and especially without a nuclear-armed ally, or whether it should pursue the
nuclear option.
Given the stakes associated with pursuing nuclear weapons, national leaders play a critical
role in decisions about nuclear proliferation.1 Nuclear-related research and development sometimes
occurs without direct political authorization. Members of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission,
for instance, decided to construct a small nuclear reactor in 1969 without obtaining permission
from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (Perkovich 1999, 150). However, the actual decision to build
the bomb is generally made at the highest levels of government (Hymans 2006, 10-11). No country,
as far as we are aware, has launched a concerted and sustained effort to build nuclear weapons
without the backing of a national leader. It is hard to say much about the Chinese bomb without
mentioning Mao Zedong; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the clear driver of the Pakistani nuclear weapons
program in the early stages, having famously proclaimed that his people would “eat grass” in order
to build the bomb; Muammar Qaddafi was intimately associated with Libya’s campaign to acquire
WMD; there may not have been an Israeli nuclear weapons program in the 1950s without David Ben
Gurion; and Josep Broz Tito was the face of Yugoslavia’s early efforts to acquire atomic weapons.
Despite the seemingly obvious connection between leaders and nuclear proliferation, most re-
search in political science has assumed that who is in power in a country has little bearing on the
proliferation process. Yet there is some recognition that leaders play an important role. Solingen
(2007), for example, suggests that leaders evaluate how decisions about nuclear proliferation will
1This is true even in democracies (where domestic politics often constrain leaders) because
nuclear weapons programs are among the most secretive and discretionary of programs (Rhodes
1986).
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affect their ability to remain in power. She argues that ruling coalitions that favor integration in the
global economy should be less likely to proliferate, while inward looking governments may exploit
the bomb as a nationalist tool aimed at shoring up their hold on power. Hymans (2006) places
even more emphasis on individual leaders, arguing that their conceptions of national identity affect
whether they will build the bomb. In particular, leaders who have an “oppositional nationalist”
national identity conception, which is characterized by the emotions of fear and pride, are more
likely to go nuclear. O’Reilly (2012) similarly shows that a leader’s perception of the international
environment influences whether she decides to pursue the bomb. This research contributes to the
proliferation literature by spotlighting attention on domestic institutions and leaders. However,
scholarly understanding of how leaders’ beliefs and experiences affect nuclear proliferation remains
incomplete. Political scientists have yet to systematically consider how leaders’ backgrounds – which
shape their beliefs and worldviews – influence the spread of nuclear weapons.2
In the next section, we generate a new leader-centric theory of nuclear proliferation. Our theory
turns the emphasis to the individual leader and, in particular, the way that leaders’ prior life
experiences may influence their propensity to seek nuclear weapons.
Why Prior Rebel Experience Affects Nuclear Proliferation
The experiences leaders have prior to entering office naturally shape the way they view the world.
Life experiences shape everything from the way leaders view the likely success and failure of par-
ticular strategies to how they view their own personal efficacy at pursuing different policy options.
Prior research shows that this can have a significant impact on the policies that leaders pursue in
office (Saunders 2011; Jervis 1976; Goldgeier 1994; Kennedy 2011). We argue in this section that
prior rebel service is a particularly poignant experience that causes leaders to excessively value
national independence, distrust other countries to provide for their defense, and generally have a
2Existing research that focuses on leaders and proliferation is based on a small number of well-
done historical case studies. Hymans, for instance, conducts an impressive historical analysis but
his conclusions are based on only Argentina, Australia, France, and India. This article is the first
to employ large-n analysis to the study of nuclear proliferation using leaders as the unit of analysis.
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higher tolerance for risk. Through these mechanisms, prior rebel participation makes leaders more
likely to value the potential benefits of possessing nuclear weapons.
Rebel service represents an important life event, in part, because participants at the level of
future leaders face the risk of death to advocate for a cause in which they believe. It often, though
not always, occurs during in a period of life, early adulthood, where experiences have a large-
scale effect on future behavior (Roberts et al. 2003). Park Chung Hee, who led the “May 16
Revolution” in South Korea before becoming president of the country, underscored the salience of
rebel service when he discussed the “weighty pressure” he felt after risking his life to lead the military
coup (Park 1970, 21, 58). Although rebel service shares some similarities with uniformed military
service, our argument about the focus on independence should be particular to former rebels.3 Prior
participation in a rebellion increases the likelihood that leaders will try and build the bomb for two
main reasons.
First, leaders that participate in rebellions before taking office – whether or not the rebellion
itself is what brings them into power – have an appreciation of the tenuous nature of national
authority and sovereignty. They have already existed in a world where they lacked power and
influence over the organs of national power. Since prior rebel leaders have personal experience
engaging in a military struggle for national independence or control of the government, they should
place an especially high premium on independence and sovereignty. They have had to fight for their
own independence, so they do not want to see it jeopardized. They are also more aware of how easily
regime change can occur. While we tend to think about “who” constitutes rebels fairly narrowly,
with leaders such as Mao coming to mind, anyone that attempts to overthrow the government is
technically a rebel.4 Leaders with prior rebel experience are thus more likely to pursue policies
designed to preserve independence. Park (1970, 155), for example, wrote in his memoir that “the
Korean society should become independent . . . and produce . . . a self-ruling country” that is not
overly reliant on the United States. That mindset is typical of a former rebel that comes to power.
3We also show in the online Appendix that including a variable for whether a leader served in
a uniformed military does not change our results. They also do not change if we create a variable
combining rebel and military experience.
4See the research design section for more on our rebel definition.
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Given that nuclear weapons can provide a critical degree of protection against invasion, it
naturally makes former rebels positively inclined to think about building them. Indeed, rebel
experience may cause leaders to embrace the identity characteristic of “oppositional nationalism”
that Hymans (2006, 2) argues makes individuals more likely to support nuclear weapons programs.5
For example, Mao Zedong’s worldview was profoundly influenced by his early experiences as a rebel
and the tactics that allowed the Communists to succeed in the Chinese Civil War (Goldstein 2005;
Schwartz 1951; Rice 1972). In particular, once in office, Mao’s decision to build nuclear weapons
was driven by nationalism and a desire to avoid being held hostage by the great powers (Kennedy
2011, 119-122). He feared that China and other non-nuclear states would be forced to “kneel and
obey orders meekly, as if they were nuclear slaves” (Krepon 2009, 101). To avoid this outcome and
pursue an independent foreign policy, Mao believed that China must possess nuclear weapons. He
told colleagues in 1958 that without the bomb, “others don’t think what we say carries weight” (Lewis
& Litai 1988, 36). In light of these views, which stemmed from Mao’s revolutionary experiences,
Beijing would probably have pursued nuclear weapons even without the crises in Korea, Indochina,
and the Taiwan Strait (Lewis & Litai 1988, 35).
The focus on independence and recognition of the tenuous nature of their rule also makes
former rebels less willing to trust external security guarantees. Mao’s persistent fear of great power
interference and influence over China typifies this perspective (Kennedy 2011, 124-125). Former
rebels are less likely to completely rely on alliances or extended deterrence promises to guarantee
their security because their direct experience demonstrates the instability of those promises. For
example, while Charles de Gaulle feared the Soviet Union more than the United States, he always
worried about the extent to which allying with Washington would threaten France’s independence
(Spirtas 1998, 310).6 As Bozo (2001, xi) writes, “independence was the immutable bedrock of
Gaullist policy within the alliance.” When de Gaulle withdrew France from the military command
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the specific logic had to do with protecting
5In other words, prior rebel experience could represent one of the micro-foundations of opposi-
tional nationalism.
6We discuss the de Gaulle coding below. Excluding de Gaulle or all French leaders does not
significantly change the results reported below.
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France’s independence and ensuring French sovereignty. De Gaulle rose to office specifically based
on his promise to uphold French sovereignty and protect France given its recent experience of
occupation during World War II (Grosser 1963, 200). This same reasoning drove the leaders of the
Fourth Republic and de Gaulle to pursue nuclear weapons.
Rejecting military integration with NATO and arguing that France needed its own atomic bomb,
de Gaulle explicitly argued that France had to provide for its own security, stating in a speech that
“The nation’s defense can only be a national defense” (Aron 1966, 159). Furniss (1961, 354) describes
de Gaulle as thinking that “the weapon in French hands would be the indispensable requisite for
national independence, and would enable France to take action alone if necessary to protect her
vital interests.” Former rebels who enter office are those that survive – and more often those that
experience at least some degree of success in their rebellions. These life experiences gives leaders
calculated reasons for not trusting external security guarantees and desiring security independence.
When leaders lack rebel experience, they are often more willing to trust their allies to provide for
their security. For example, Japanese leaders since the 1950s – all of whom lacked rebel experience
– generally trusted the United States to defend it and therefore perceived less of a strategic need
for an independent nuclear deterrent. Leaders in Turkey and West Germany have likewise been
dissuaded from going nuclear due, in part, to the NATO alliance.
A second reason to expect that former rebels will pursue nuclear weapons has to do with their
greater risk acceptance. There is a reciprocal relationship between rebel experience and risk accep-
tance. On one hand, former rebels who become national leaders tend to be more risk acceptant as a
whole. They are generally not the lower-level fighters that are coercively selected into a rebel group
or otherwise join due to fears for personal safety (Kalyvas & Kocher 2007). Instead, the decision
to participate in a rebellion is a conscious choice made by individuals who are naturally willing to
accept a higher level of risk, given the dangers. This is relevant because, as explained previously,
pursuing nuclear weapons is also an exceptionally dangerous path. Nuclear weapons pursuit can
invite external sanctions and force countries to bear significant economic costs. Countries can also
place themselves at risk of attack in the interim before they acquire nuclear weapons or even once
they have a small arsenal. Leaders who were willing to accept the dangers associated with rebel
service should naturally be less worried about the hazards of pursuing nuclear weapons.
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On the other hand, rebel service itself can affect an individual’s propensity to accept risk. Former
rebels who become national leaders often believe that their actions will lead to success even when
others view them as risky. Kennedy (2011), for example, shows how prior successes and failures
shape the strategies that leaders consider in office and the extent to which they are willing to accept
risks – or view choices as risky in the first place. For example, Mao’s military successes as a rebel
made him confident in his ability to use military coercion and threats to achieve his goals once he
entered office, even when outside observers viewed those choices as risky. He had seen what he could
accomplish when he focused China’s people on an important objective (Rice 1972, 101). For Mao,
those choices were not risky since they were similar to choices he had made in the past – and which
had succeeded.
Since former rebels are more risk acceptant in general – or less likely to see actions as risky, as per
Kennedy – they are likely to overestimate their ability to build nuclear weapons and underestimate
the financial and international reputational costs of pursuing the bomb. Thus, efficacy beliefs drawn
from their rebel experiences, combined with a greater predisposition to risk, could make former
rebels even more likely to seek nuclear weapons.7 This general argument should also apply more
broadly to policy choices that may be characterized as “risky.” Indeed, recent research (Anonymous)
demonstrates that former rebels are more likely to initiate militarized disputes and wars.
Our central claim is not that those with prior rebel experience will necessarily pursue nuclear
weapons. There are many other factors that influence whether or not a leader decides to initiate or
continue a nuclear weapons program. However, the theoretical argument advanced above suggests
7Jeff Colgan (2010, 2013) similarly argues that revolutionary leaders are more likely to initiate
military conflicts because they are risk acceptant and ambitious. Our argument differs from Col-
gan’s in two primary ways. First, Colgan’s argument focuses mostly on how revolutionary regimes
select for risk-acceptant leaders. While a part of our claim, our argument also emphasizes the effi-
cacy beliefs derived from actual experience as a rebel. Second, our argument highlights how rebel
experience cultivates an obsession with national independence, and this is not a mechanism em-
phaiszed by Colgan. Empirically, there is only a 37 percent overlap between Colgan’s revolutionary
leader variable and our rebel universe. We address the relationship between revolutionary leaders
and rebels empirically in the online Appendix.
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that those with prior rebel experience should be more likely, all other things being equal, to pursue
nuclear weapons. These leads to our central hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Countries with former rebels as heads of state are more likely than states with
non-rebel leaders, on average, to pursue nuclear weapons programs.
Potential Objections to the Argument
One possibility is that our theory reflects an endogenous selection process whereby the countries
that are most likely to produce leaders with prior rebel experience are also systematically more likely
to pursue nuclear weapons. These types of leaders also might be especially insecure for institutional
reasons (Chiozza & Goemans 2011), making them more likely to engage in military buildups to
prevent external invasion.
A relationship between rebel experience and nuclear proliferation might also merely indicate
that countries emerging from civil wars or occupations are more likely to select leaders who share
a preoccupation with national independence. Related to this, some countries – particularly those
that recently experience civil wars – have a larger pool of rebel leaders from which the selectorate
can choose. This omitted variable bias could influence any findings. Finally, our argument may
simply reflect differences driven by regime types like personalist regimes.
We explicitly control for all of these possibilities in our empirical analysis below by accounting
for the selection of rebels into office along with other potentially unexplained national level variance;
doing so does not undermine our results. Leaders with prior rebel service have an important effect
on the proliferation process even when we account for a variety of factors related to the security
environment and institutional forces that bring leaders into office.
Measuring Nuclear Proliferation and Rebel Experience
Are former rebels more likely to pursue nuclear weapons? Answering this question requires data on
nuclear weapons proliferation and participation in rebel activities.
Coding a state’s nuclear behavior is sometimes challenging since nuclear weapons programs may
be shrouded in secrecy. However, over the last decade, scholars have produced new time-series-cross-
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section datasets that identify states’ interest in the bomb. We begin with a nuclear proliferation
dataset compiled by Bleek (2010), which builds on earlier efforts to code nuclear behavior (e.g.,
Singh & Way 2004; Jo & Gartzke 2007). We use the Bleek data in part because it makes it harder
to find evidence in favor of our theory.8 Almost all of the countries that were excluded by Bleek but
that could plausibly be coded as pursuing nuclear weapons were ruled by former rebels: Argentina
(Videla and Galtieri), Egypt (Nasser and Sadat), Syria (Al-Assad), and Taiwan (Chiang Kai-shek).
We can therefore be more confident that our argument is correct if it is empirically supported using
the Bleek dataset. As we show in the online Appendix to this article, including the aforementioned
cases – and using other datasets employed in the literature – only strengthens the empirical support
for our theory.
We adapted the existing data to make it suitable for a leader-centric analysis. Nuclear weapons
programs often begin (and end) during years where there is at least one leadership turnover. India,
for instance, first pursued nuclear weapons in 1964 – a year in which three different men were
in power: Jawaharlal Nehru, Gulzarilal Nanda, and Lal Bahadur Shastri. The datasets used in
other quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation do not tell us whether some or all of these leaders
pursued the bomb. We therefore conducted additional historical research to determine which leaders
initiated (and terminated) nuclear weapons programs. Returning to the Indian example, Shastri
was the initiator of the nuclear explosives program, and his two immediate predecessors did not
pursue the bomb.
A dichotomous variable, Nuclear weapons pursuit, is coded 1 if a leader is actively trying to
build nuclear weapons in year t and 0 if not. We show later in the paper, however, that our findings
are consistent when we model the initiation of a nuclear weapons program only, excluding decisions
to continue an existing program.9 Table 1 lists the leaders that pursued the bomb and years of
pursuit. As the table reveals, 41 leaders in 16 different countries pursued nuclear weapons from
8Bleek also provides detailed case descriptions based on a large number of high quality sources,
making it possible for us to scrutinize his coding decisions, though others have done that as well.
9This variable is coded missing once a state builds the bomb, meaning that nuclear weapons
states are dropped from our sample. The online Appendix shows that including these states does
not affect the results.
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1945 to 2000. Nuclear weapons pursuit occurs in about 3.1 percent (214/6,735) of the leader-year
observations in our sample.
We operationalize rebel experience using a new dataset that builds on the backbone of Archigos
(Goemans et al. 2009) to incorporate the backgrounds of more than 2,500 leaders (Anonymous).
This dataset includes a variable that categorizes leaders based on prior rebel service. Rebel experience
is a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if a leader participated in activities designed to overthrow
the government of a state prior to coming into office and 0 otherwise.10 It is also important to note
that our rebel variable includes individuals who participate in civil conflict (e.g., Mao) and wars of
national liberation (e.g., de Gaulle). We utilize a fairly broad coding scheme because, theoretically,
it is the act of rebelling and the fundamental risk associated with doing so that drives our argument.
All of these types of rebellious activities involve being willing to overthrow a national government,
making them rebel activity according to our theory.
One potential concern is that some rebels come into power immediately as a direct result of
successful coups or revolutions (e.g., Zia) while others serve in office, often as a result of elections,
years after participating in rebellious activities (e.g., several of the post-World War II French lead-
ers). We account for both of these concerns in our models below by including an Irregular entry
variable. This variable allows us to evaluate whether the relationship between rebel experience and
nuclear proliferation is driven by leaders who enter office through irregular means such as coups.
Another possible objection to our rebel definition is that it includes leaders such as de Gaulle
who were pursuing wars of national independence and wearing formal “uniforms,” which could make
them more like regular military personnel and less like rebels.11 De Gaulle had “rebelled against
the state” (Thompson 1974, 257), but he did wear a “regular” military uniform. According to the
10Our definition captures violent (Castro) and nonviolent (Nehru) activities, as long as a partic-
ipant’s objective is to depose the leader in power. Reclassifying nonviolent leaders as non-rebels
does not change the results. It might be fruitful to disaggregate participation in political violence
– for example by distinguishing terrorism from participation in an armed rebellion. Unfortunately
we do not have the data to explore this possibility, but it is a promising avenue for future research.
11We address this concern empirically below, showing that our results are consistent when we
exclude many of the leaders who fought against external occupiers.
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Country Leader Years
Brazil Ernesto Geisel? 1975-79
João Figueiredo 1979-85
José Sarney 1985-90
Fernando Collor de Mello 1990
China Mao Zedong? 1956-63
France Pierre Mendes? 1954-55
Edgar Faure? 1955-56
Guy Mollet? 1956-57
Maurice Bourges-Maunory? 1957
Felix Gaillard? 1957-58
Pierre Pflimin? 1958
Charles de Gaulle? 1958-59
India Lal Bahadur Shastri? 1964-66
Gulzari Lal Nanda? 1966
Indira Gandhi 1966, 1972-84
Rajiv Gandhi 1984-86
Iran Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani? 1989-97
Mohammad Khatami 1997-2000
Iraq Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr? 1976-79
Saddam Hussein? 1979-91
Israel David Ben Gurion? 1955-63
Levi Eshkol? 1963-66
Libya Muammar Qaddafi? 1970-2000
North Korea Kim Il-Sung? 1980-1994
Kim Jong-Il 1994-2000
Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 1972-77
Muhammad Zia? 1977-86
Russia Josef Stalin? 1945-48
South Africa John Vorster? 1974-78
P.W. Botha 1978
South Korea Park Chung-hee? 1970-75
Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito? 1953-62
Petar Stambolic? 1982-83
Mika Spiljak? 1983-84
Veselin Djuranovic? 1984-85
Radovan Vlajkovic? 1985-86
Sinan Hasani? 1986-87
Lazar Mojsov? 1987
United Kingdom Winston Churchill 1945, 1951
Clement Atlee 1945-51
United States Franklin D. Roosevelt 1945
note: Data are right-censored; asterisks denote leaders with rebel experience
Table 1. Leaders and Nuclear Weapons Pursuit, 1945–2000.
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same rules used to classify those that fought against colonial occupations, de Gaulle’s activities
count as “rebel” action. It is not possible to gather extensive enough data on uniforming and other
norms of behavior that might indicate experiences more like “regular” militaries. The clearest, most
objective definition of rebel behavior is the definition we employ. However, we discuss the potential
implications of this coding decision below when conducting our empirical analysis.
It is also important to note that leaders with rebel experience are not necessarily dictators. Some
former rebels certainly became authoritarian leaders (e.g., Saddam and Stalin), but many others
headed democratic governments (e.g., Ben Gurion and Aquino). Our rebel measure is therefore not
simply a proxy for authoritarianism.
About 36 percent of the leader-year observations in our sample feature rebel experience. As
Table 1 shows, many leaders who pursued nuclear weapons were former rebels. To properly evaluate
whether this is indicative of a broader trend, we must compare the rate of nuclear proliferation among
rebel leaders to non-rebels’ propensity to build the bomb.
Methods and Findings
To test our hypothesis on the effect of leader experience on nuclear proliferation, we focus on
leaders in the international system from 1945 to 2000.12 We obtained information on the universe
of leaders as well as when they entered and exited office from Goemans et al. (2009). Our setup
takes advantage of a larger amount of variation in national behavior than past studies by focusing on
the leader-year rather than the country-year. Past research, even when it emphasizes the domestic
political institutions of states, generally only has one observation per year even if there is more
than one leader. This potentially introduces bias into the results, since each leader has to make a
decision in a given year about whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons. To correct this, our unit
of analysis is the leader year and we weigh each observation based on how long the leader spent in
12We begin our analysis in 1945 because data on many of our independent variables are unavailable
prior to that date. We find support for our hypothesis when we extend the analysis back to 1940
and only include the covariates for which we have complete data.
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Figure 1. Rebel Experience and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons.
office that year. Our sample includes 1,322 leaders and a total of 6,949 leader-year observations.13
As a preliminary means of evaluating our hypothesis, we compare the rate of nuclear weapons
pursuit among rebel and non-rebel observations in our sample. As Figure 1 illustrates, leaders with
rebel experience are considerably more likely than leaders that lack this experience to pursue nuclear
weapons. The percentage of leader-year observations featuring both nuclear weapons pursuit and
rebel experience naturally fluctuates slightly over time, but the disparity between the behavior of
rebels and non-rebels is striking across the entire nuclear age. During the 1980s, for instance, 8.42
percent of the leader-year observations in the sample with rebel experience experienced nuclear
weapons pursuit – compared to only 2.15 percent for non-rebels.
These findings provide initial evidence in favor of our hypothesis. Yet every leader with rebel
experience does not attempt to build nuclear weapons, and some leaders without rebel experience
pursue the bomb. Remarkably, however, the overwhelming majority of leaders who were in power
when nuclear weapons programs began were former rebels, as Table 1 above shows. Every country
that pursued nuclear weapons – except the United Kingdom and the United States – had at least
one former rebel in power while the government was actively trying to acquire the bomb.
The analysis conducted up to this point, however, does not account for other factors that could
13The number of observations in our sample fluctuates slightly based on which independent
variables we include in our statistical model and how we construct the dependent variable.
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affect nuclear proliferation. Because rebel leaders are not randomly assigned to countries, we must
account for confounding variables to be sure that the relationship between rebel experience and
nuclear weapons is not spurious. We do so by conducting a multivariate statistical analysis that
accounts for other explanations that are prominent in the existing literature on the causes of nuclear
proliferation. When specifying our empirical models, we adopt a research strategy similar to the
one employed by Way & Weeks (2012). We are mindful of two potential issues: omitted variable
bias and post-treatment bias. Omitted variable bias occurs when analysts exclude factors that are
associated with the main independent variable of interest and the dependent variable. One could
not properly evaluate the connection between party identification and voting, for instance, without
controlling for race – a factor that influences one’s choice of party and how she votes. Post-treatment
bias results when scholars include covariates in their models that are caused by the key independent
variable. As King & Zeng (2006, 147) explain, including such variables inappropriately controls for
the effects of the main variable, biasing the findings. In a study of how party identification affects
voting behavior, it would be problematic to control for one’s intended vote five minutes before
entering the voting booth. Doing so would make it seem as though one’s party does not affect how
she votes, which of course is not the case (King & Zeng 2006, 147).
In an ideal world, a proper test of the relationship between rebel experience and nuclear prolif-
eration would control for factors that cause both of these variables, while excluding covariates that
are caused by rebel experience. Despite our efforts to exclude variables that are obviously post-
treatment, some might argue that a few of the controls described below could be a consequence
of rebel experience.14 This is why the statistical analysis below begins with a “pure” model that
only evaluates the effect of prior rebel experience on nuclear weapons pursuit. We also estimate
a “trimmed” model that includes some control variables while excluding potentially problematic
covariates and a “full” model that includes all of the controls. Our full model includes the following
variables:
14However, some seemingly post-treatment controls are less problematic for our purposes. We
argue that former rebels are less likely to trust alliances – not less likely to form them – so it is
appropriate to control for alliances with nuclear-armed states. Former rebels may form alliances as
insurance even if they end up having little effect on nuclear policy, as the case of France illustrates.
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Irregular entry, Civil war, and Polity. The countries that are most likely to produce leaders
with prior rebel experience may also be systematically more likely to pursue nuclear weapons, as
we previously discussed. We control for how a leader entered office, whether a country recently
experienced civil war, and the nature of a state’s domestic political institutions to account for this
possibility. Irregular entry is a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if a leader rose to power through
irregular means and 0 if not (Goemans et al. 2009). A cross-tabulation of rebels and those who
enter office through irregular means, available in the online Appendix, demonstrates that we have
significant variation on how leaders enter office.15 Civil war is coded 1 if a country has been involved
in a civil war in the last five years and 0 otherwise (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Polity measures a state’s
regime type based on the widely employed 21-point composite indicator (Marshall et al. 2009).16
Borders. Many have argued that states pursue nuclear weapons when they face external threats.
Existing quantitative studies usually test this argument using standard indicators of a state’s se-
curity environment such as participation in militarized interstate disputes. However, given that
former rebels are more likely than non-rebels to initiate militarized disputes (Anonymous), inter-
state conflict is a “post-treatment” control and including it in our model could complicate our ability
to unpack the relationship between rebel experience and nuclear weapons programs. Following Way
& Weeks (2012), we deal with this issue by using the number of land and sea borders as a proxy
for a state’s security environment. States that are geographically proximate to other countries are
more likely to experience interstate conflict, but it would be hard to argue that leader backgrounds
cause a state to have a greater (or fewer) number of neighbors. As we show below, however, our
findings are similar when we use more traditional indicators of a state’s security environment.
Superpower alliance. Alliances with nuclear-armed states can serve as a substitute for indepen-
dent nuclear deterrents. We include a variable measuring whether a state has a defense pact with
a superpower that possesses nuclear weapons.
15This measure is correlates with Rebel experience, but not at a level that would raise collinearity-
related concerns.
16This variable ranges from -10 to +10, with higher scores indicating greater levels of democracy.
As shown in the online Appendix, our findings are similar if we use dichotomous variables to
operationalize democratic and autocratic regimes.
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Nuclear cooperation agreements. Foreign assistance in developing civilian nuclear programs is
thought to increase the likelihood that a state will pursue nuclear weapons, in part, because it
reduces the expected costs of a bomb program (Fuhrmann 2012). We control for the size of a
state’s civilian nuclear program by including a variable that counts the number of bilateral civilian
nuclear cooperation agreements a state has signed from 1945 to year t that entitle it to receive aid
in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Gross domestic product per capita. Wealthier states have a greater capacity to build nuclear
weapons, which could make them more likely to pursue the bomb. We use a state’s GDP per capita
as a proxy for its wealth.17
Economic openness. States that are exposed to the global economy may be deterred from
pursuing nuclear weapons by the prospect of economic sanctions or the loss of foreign investment
(Solingen 2007). Consistent with a standard practice in the quantitative literature, we control for
this by including the ratio of a state’s trade (imports + exports) to its GDP.
Nonproliferation Treaty status. The NPT prohibits most states from building nuclear weapons.
Because states generally want to keep the international commitments that they make, those that
ratify the NPT may be less likely to pursue nuclear weapons than those that do not. For our
purposes, it is not relevant whether one thinks of treaty ratification as a reflection of state interests
or as a constraint on behavior. We construct a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a state has ratified
the NPT in a given year and 0 otherwise.18 In the online Appendix, we show that our results are
consistent even if we restrict the sample to the NPT time period, meaning they are not just driven
by the pre-NPT period.
Time, Time2, and Time3. Most leaders are included in our dataset multiple times, and these
within-leader observations may not be truly independent. To address possible temporal dependence
in our data, we include a count of the number of years that have passed since a leader has been in
power without pursuing nuclear weapons, along with its square and its cube (Carter & Signorino
2010).
17We take the natural log of this measure to address the variable’s skewed distribution.
18Given the “stickiness” of NPT ratification, we also estimate a model that measures the number
of years a state has been party to the treaty and it does not affect the results.
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Table 2 displays the findings from a logit analysis of nuclear weapons pursuit.19 The standard
errors are clustered by leader to address heteroskedasticity among heads of government in the
sample.20 States often have multiple leaders in the same year because new leaders rarely begin their
terms on January 1. As described above, we therefore weight each observation in the sample based
on how many days a leader served in a year.
The four models in Table 2 test our hypothesis while addressing concerns about post-treatment
bias. Our model generally makes good predictions about leaders’ nuclear behavior, especially relative
to what is typical in international relations research when using a panel dataset. A receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve, available in the online Appendix, shows that the area under the curve
is 0.97, meaning that if a “proliferator” and a “nonproliferator” were drawn at random there is a 97
percent probability that the former would have a higher expected likelihood of proliferation.
One might take the extreme position that all of the control variables described above, in one
way or another, could be caused by having a former rebel in power. We therefore begin with a
model that includes Rebel experience along with the time-related variables and excludes the other
controls (model 1). Next, we add the controls designed to account for the factors that might
allow former rebels to come to power (Irregular entry, Civil war, and Polity) and Borders – the
independent variable that controls for the security environment and is least likely to be caused by
rebel experience (model 2). Model 3 is our full model that includes all of the covariates described
earlier. Model 4 uses two alternate measures of a state’s security in lieu of Borders: the five-year
moving average of militarized interstate dispute participation (Militarized interstate disputes) and
whether a state is involved in an enduring rivalry (Rivalry) (Singh & Way 2004). As described
above, these variables are post-treatment since research shows that former rebels are more likely
to engage in militarized disputes (Anonymous), but they are included as covariates in most past
proliferation research.
19Logit is an appropriate estimator because our dependent variable is dichotomous. We also
estimate a rare events logit model and Cox regression analysis. The findings are similar in both
cases (see the online Appendix).
20As shown in the online Appendix, the findings are similar when we cluster the standard errors
by country.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bivariate Trimmed Full Post-treatment
controls
Rebel experience 1.607∗∗∗ 1.512∗∗∗ 2.089∗∗∗ 1.731∗∗∗
(0.464) (0.424) (0.527) (0.465)
Civil war 0.493 0.0900 -0.402
(0.415) (0.418) (0.439)
Irregular entry -0.395 -0.690 -0.344
(0.535) (0.561) (0.563)
Polity -0.0533 -0.0844∗ -0.0998∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0388) (0.0346)
Borders 0.273∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗
(0.0625) (0.0744)
Superpower alliance -1.530∗ -1.366∗
(0.669) (0.632)
Nuclear cooperation agreements 0.215∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.0560) (0.0551)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.0918 0.252
(0.181) (0.196)
NPT -0.919∗ -0.678∗
(0.384) (0.336)
Economic openness -0.0151+ -0.0128
(0.00785) (0.00820)
Rivalry 0.737
(0.460)
Militarized interstate dispute 0.464∗∗
(0.161)
Time -3.688∗∗∗ -2.216∗∗∗ -2.294∗∗∗ -2.547∗∗∗
(0.910) (0.279) (0.345) (0.407)
Time Squared 0.265∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.0762) (0.0251) (0.0259) (0.0335)
Time Cubed -0.00491∗ -0.00267∗∗ -0.00277∗∗∗ -0.00308∗∗
(0.00194) (0.000819) (0.000833) (0.00102)
Constant -2.389∗∗∗ -4.098∗∗∗ -3.772∗ -4.605∗∗
(0.308) (0.648) (1.834) (1.715)
Observations 8710 7974 6949 6879
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001, two-tailed tests
Table 2. Logit analysis of nuclear weapons pursuit.
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The coefficient on Rebel experience is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels
in all of the models from Table 2. In support of our theory, these findings reveal that there is less
than a 0.1 percent chance that we would observe a relationship between rebel experience and nuclear
proliferation by chance alone. The consistency of the results across models 1-4 demonstrates that
our main finding is robust to various model specifications.
Specifically, as we mentioned previously, one potential concern is that these results simply reflect
an endogenous selection process whereby the countries that are most likely to produce leaders with
prior rebel experience – those that recently experienced civil wars or other domestic turmoil – are
also systematically more likely to pursue nuclear weapons. We therefore control for whether a
country was previously involved in a civil war, whether the leader entered office through irregular
means such as a coup, and regime type to isolate the relative effect of former rebels. If countries
that have recently experienced domestic turmoil are more likely to produce former rebels as leaders
and more likely to pursue nuclear weapons, adding these variables should wash out the significance
of Rebel experience. As models 2-4 show, however, adding these variables does not undermine our
findings. Rebel experience remains strongly and significantly associated with the pursuit of nuclear
weapons even when controlling for factors that might predict whether or not leaders have rebel
experience.
The case of Israel usefully illuminates these results. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s
prior rebel experience precipitated concerns about national independence that, in turn, contributed
to his decision to build nuclear weapons. Ben-Gurion’s experience fighting for Israeli independence
led him to conclude that Israel could not rely on external powers to guarantee the existence of Israel
(Cohen 1998, xxii, 12). According to Avner Cohen, this directly influenced Ben-Gurion’s belief that
Israel could only ensure its independence through acquiring nuclear weapons: “Ben-Gurion settled
on the bomb as Israel’s ultimate guarantee for survival in a hostile environment” (Cohen 1998,
xxii). The Israeli leader’s prior experience as a rebel and his perception of the insecurity of Jewish
independence drove his threat perceptions in ways that made him less amenable to seeking out or
trusting security guarantees from external powers.
The decisions of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine regarding the nuclear weapons they inherited
from the Soviet Union likewise provide supporting evidence in favor of our theory. Each country
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was newly independent and in the shadow of a great power that had colonized them – Russia. Yet
each country decided to give up the nuclear weapons they inherited from the Soviet Union, making
them more theoretically vulnerable to Russian coercion. While many factors drove their decision,
it is notable that none of the three initial leaders of these states, Kravchuk (Belarus), Shushkevich
(Ukraine), and Nazarbaev (Kazakhstan) had prior rebel experience. If these leaders had been former
rebels, our theory predicts that they would have been more inclined to keep the inherited weapons.
How substantively important is rebel experience in shaping the probability of nuclear weapons
pursuit? Figure 2 address this issue by displaying how the likelihood of nuclear proliferation changes
when Rebel experience shifts from 0 to 1 and other factors are held constant at the sample means (for
continuous variables) or modes (for dichotomous variables).21 The figure shows that former rebels
have nearly a 25 percent probability of pursuing the bomb in a given year. Yet, under identical
circumstances, non-rebels have a predicted probability of nuclear weapons pursuit of only about
4 percent. The confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities in these two scenarios do
not overlap, meaning that the difference between them is statistically significant. To underscore
the magnitude of this difference, we calculate the relative risk of Rebel experience – the ratio of
the probability of nuclear weapons pursuit in the “treatment” group (leaders with rebel experience)
divided by the same probability in the “control” group (leaders without rebel experience). The
relative risk is 6.42, meaning that rebel experience increases the probability of nuclear weapons
pursuit by about 542 percent. As we discuss later, this is quite a large effect in comparison to the
other variables in the model.
To further evaluate the relative impact of former rebel experience on proliferation, we isolate
the effect of a country switching from a non-rebel leader to a rebel leader on the probability of
initiating a nuclear weapons program. We generate a lag variable (Rebel lag) that equals 1 if the
prior leader was a rebel and 0 otherwise, and interact it with the Rebel experience variable. The
results, available in the online Appendix, demonstrate that switching from a non-rebel to a rebel
leader dramatically increases the probability of nuclear weapons program initiation by over 17 times,
21These calculations are based on Model 3. The three time-related variables are held constant at
0. This will naturally increase the probability of proliferation with and without rebel experience –
compared to a scenario where the time-related variables are set to their mean values.
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Figure 2. Predicted Probability of Nuclear Weapons Pursuit by Rebel Experience.
or over 1,600 percent, compared to switching from a non-rebel to another non-rebel leader.
Consider a case from the dataset – West Germany in 1974 – to illuminate the substantive
importance of rebel experience. Many policymakers in the United States and the Soviet Union
were concerned, with good reason, that West Germany would initiate a nuclear weapons program
during the 1970s but Bonn ultimately remained nonnuclear. In 1974, West Germany elected a new
leader, Helmut Schmidt, who lacked rebel experience. What if a leader who had participated in a
militarized rebellion had instead rose to power? Our model predicts that the probability of a West
Germany bomb program would have risen dramatically, from 0.28 to 0.76, if a former rebel had been
in power and all other factors remained constant. This does not imply that a different leader with
rebel experience definitely would have pursued the bomb. There were other factors – including the
alliance with the United States – that contributed to Bonn’s nuclear restraint. However, the point
here is that, according to our model, the probability of a West German nuclear weapons program
would have increased dramatically if a leader with rebel experience had come to power in lieu of
Schmidt.
In terms of the control variables, once we slightly relax our concern about post-treatment bias,
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our findings are similar to those reported in other studies. Threatening security environments
appear to be associated with a higher likelihood of nuclear proliferation, as indicated by the positive
and statistically significant coefficients on Borders (models 1-3) as well as Rivalry and Militarized
interstate disputes (model 4). The coefficient on Nuclear cooperation agreements is positive and
statistically significant, indicating that increases in nuclear assistance raise the likelihood of nuclear
weapons pursuit. We also find that democracies, allies of superpowers, NPT members, and states
that are exposed to the global economy are less likely to pursue the bomb.22 However, Irregular
entry, Civil war, GDP per capita, and Economic openness are statistically insignificant. The results
are also consistent when we add in the overall material capabilities of a state into the model (see
the online Appendix).23
Some of the controls are substantively significant. For example, a one standard deviation increase
in the number of nuclear cooperation agreements a state has signed (from 2 to 6 treaties) increases
the probability of nuclear weapons pursuit by 124 percent. Generally speaking, however, the size
of these effects is dwarfed by Rebel experience. These results indicate that our theory is not the
only one that sheds light on nuclear proliferation, but rebel experience does appear to be among
the most important factors that shape leaders’ nuclear behavior. Figure A in the online Appendix
compares the substantive effects of the control variables to the previously reported effect of Rebel
experience.
The three time-related variables are statistically significant, and they collectively indicate that
leaders are less likely to initiate a bomb program the longer that they serve in office without
proliferating. Thus, if rebels are going to initiate a nuclear weapons program, they are likely to do
so early in their tenure. Numerous cases underscore this point: Mendes, Rafsanjani, and Stambolic
all initiated nuclear weapons programs the same year that they came to power; Geisel and Qaddafi
22The results are consistent if we change the alliance variable to reflect alliances with any nuclear
powers, not just the superpowers. Consistent with our theory, alliances appear to deter non-rebel
leaders from pursuing nuclear weapons, but the same is not true of rebels. The relevant findings
are available in the online Appendix.
23We exclude this from the main models since it overlaps with our economic variables, and since
it is post-treatment to prior rebel experience.
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launched bomb programs the year after taking control of government. We observe this effect, in part,
because leaders transform their sources of power over time (Geddes 2008; Svolik 2007). Because
institutions matter more the longer that rebels serve in office, the effect of prior rebel experience is
strongest earlier in a leader’s tenure.
In sum, regardless of how we specify the empirical model, we find a strong relationship between
leader participation in rebellions and nuclear proliferation. Our analysis suggests that this rela-
tionship emerges because leaders are influenced by their prior experiences. Individuals – and not
necessarily the factors that allow particular leaders to rise to power – therefore play an important
role in the proliferation process even if leaders’ backgrounds matter less the longer that they serve.
Answering Potential Objections
The preceding analysis shows that there is a correlation between nuclear proliferation and rebel
experience among leaders. Yet we still need to be cautious when making claims about this rela-
tionship. Our analysis relies on observational data, meaning that rebel experience is not randomly
assigned. As we noted throughout the paper, rebels come to power for particular reasons, and those
factors – rather than the rebel experience itself – could be driving the relationship we uncovered.
We previously accounted for this by controlling for irregular entry, civil wars, and regime type in
our statistical models. Here we conduct additional analysis, utilizing what we believe to be the two
best statistical techniques available to address this issue. We also conduct other tests to address
other possible objections. The relevant findings are displayed in Table 3.
First, we use country fixed effects to model country/unit level factors that may not be captured
by our initial empirical analysis. One could argue that it is not advisable to use this technique for
our analysis because doing so drops all countries that never pursued the bomb. Our estimation
sample therefore declines by 91 percent (from 6,949 to 621 observations) when we employ this
method. Yet country fixed effects are useful for addressing the aforementioned criticism: if the
alternative interpretation of our findings is correct, the statistical significance of Rebel experience
should wash away once we account for previously unmeasured country-level factors. However, as
model 5 shows, Rebel experience remains statistically significant at conventional levels (p < 0.001)
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when we employ country fixed effects. The results are also consistent when we use leader random
effects with country-clustered standard errors.
Second, we use coarsened exact matching (Iacus et al. 2012) to pre-process the data and
improve the balance across the pre-treatment independent variables.24 Through this analysis, we can
compare observations that are similar when it comes to important pre-treatment control variables
but different in terms of rebel experience. In this context, rebel experience is analogous to a
“treatment,” recognizing, of course, that we cannot perfectly emulate the conditions of a laboratory.
We start by identifying the variables on which to match: Irregular entry, Civil war, Polity, borders,
and GDP per capita.25 Next, we coarsen these variables to create particular categories for each
covariate. For instance, we can distinguish among states that have no borders, a moderate number
of borders, and a high number of borders. We then create strata that represent all of the possible
categories from the coarsened variables (there are 546 such strata), and eliminate strata that do not
contain at least one rebel observation and one non-rebel observation. Finally, using the resulting
dataset – which is more balanced – we replicate our logit model, weighting observations based
on their strata. The results, displayed in model 6, show that Rebel experience remains positive
and statistically significant when we estimate our model using a more balanced sample26 that was
produced using the matching procedure.
We acknowledge here, as we have throughout the paper, that it is difficult to unpack this
argument in an observational study. Yet, in our view, the findings from these two analyses strongly
suggest that the relationship between rebel experience and nuclear proliferation is, at the very least,
not simply a function of how leaders come to power.27 Consistent with our theory, rebel experience
24For other examples that employ a similar procedure see Hopkins (2011); Appel & Loyle (2012).
25These variables are causally prior to rebel experience and nuclear proliferation, making them
appropriate for our purposes here.
26The size of our sample declines by 40 percent (from 6,949 to 4,062 observations) when we
employ CEM.
27We also re-randomized the distribution of the rebel experience variable and ran 10,000 Monte
Carlo draws designed to test the robustness of the relationship between prior rebel experience
and nuclear weapons pursuit. The results, available in the online Appendix, show that our rebel
experience variable is highly significant even with simulated and re-randomized data.
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itself seems to shape the nuclear proliferation process.
In addition, Table 3 highlights four other robustness tests that directly speak to other concerns
about the selection of rebel leaders into office, regime type, the coding of our dependent variable,
and the competence of rebels in managing nuclear programs.
Program initiation: The initiation of a nuclear weapons program may be distinct from inheriting
a program from a previous leader. We address this concern by testing whether our findings hold
when we model the initiation rather than the continuation of nuclear programs. Rebel experience
remains statistically significant (model 7), reaffirming that our results are not just an artifact of
keeping leaders in the sample after an initial decision to pursue the bomb.
One observation per leader : It is possible that rebel proliferators take longer to build the bomb,
perhaps because of technological ineptitude. This could result in a disproportionate number of cases
in our sample where rebels pursued nuclear weapons, making it easier to reject the null hypotheses
that the relationship between rebel experience and proliferation is indistinguishable from zero. We
deal with this concern by estimating a model that only includes one observation per leader. In this
analysis, as a more conservative estimation strategy, we cluster the standard errors on the country
and include an additional covariate for the length of time a leader spent in office. Rebel experience
remains positive and statistically significant (model 8).
Personalist regimes: Way &Weeks (2012) show that personalist regimes, which are characterized
by highly centralized leadership, are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Since some former rebels
come to power in personalistic regimes, this is another reason that structural and institutional forces
unrelated to rebel experience could drive our findings.28 However, we continue to find support for
our argument when we add a control for personalistic regimes (model 9).29
Irregular entry into office: If our argument is uniquely applicable to rebels, as opposed to
those who enter office through irregular means, we would expect the relationship between rebels
and proliferation to not only hold when leaders enter office through a coup or revolution, but also
28As the online appendix shows, the results are also consistent if we add a control for revolutionary
leaders or exclude them (Colgan 2010, 674-675).
29Limiting the sample to non-personalistic regimes likewise results in a statistically significant
relationship between rebel experience and nuclear proliferation.
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through “regular” means of succession such as elections (Chiozza & Goemans 2011). While we
already control for this in our main models, consistent with our expectations, we find that Rebel
experience remains statistically significant when we limit our sample exclusively to leaders who came
to power regularly (model 10).30
Additional Robustness Tests
We conduct further empirical analysis to address a variety of other potential concerns not discussed
above or in the footnotes. Due to space constraints, we report the findings discussed here in the
online Appendix.
• Alternate nuclear weapons pursuit codings. As discussed previously, some disagreements per-
sist about whether certain countries pursued nuclear weapons or not. To address this issue,
we recode our dependent variable using two alternate nuclear proliferation datasets (Way
2011; Jo & Gartzke 2007). Rebel experience remains closely associated with nuclear weapons
pursuit.31
• Stable countries excluded. The fact that our main models include regimes that experienced
no significant domestic turmoil in a generation could bias the results. To correct for this, we
estimate a model that only includes countries that experienced a civil war or had a leader
enter office through irregular means during the previous 25 years. Our analysis shows that
Rebel experience remains statistically significant.
• Poor countries excluded. One could argue that some states lack the capacity to build nuclear
weapons and thus are unlikely to ever pursue the bomb. To evaluate whether including these
states biases our results, we excluded leader-year observations representing the poorest states
in the world.32 Rebel experience remains statistically significant.
30There is actually a large degree of variation in how former leaders enter office, as mentioned
previously and shown in a 2x2 table available in the online Appendix.
31Rebel experience is also significant when we loosen our definition of nuclear weapons pursuit to
include those countries that just “explored” nuclear weapons.
32We excluded observations when GDP per capita is less than 675 USD – the wealth of the
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• France and Yugoslavia excluded. Table 1 suggests that France and Yugoslavia are potentially
important countries for our analysis because both states had a series of former rebels who
pursued nuclear weapons in quick succession. However, our findings are not dependent on
the inclusion of these two countries: the results are similar when we remove these two states
from the sample.
• Potentially influential leaders excluded. Our definition of rebel incorporates leaders fighting
in units that one could argue resembled regular militaries, as described in the research de-
sign section. Yet our findings also hold when we exclude de Gaulle, Ben Gurion, and other
potentially influential leaders that might be considered non-rebels.
• Post-NPT period only. Proliferation dynamics may have fundamentally changed following the
introduction of the NPT in 1968. Yet Rebel experience remains statistically significant when
we limit our analysis to the post-NPT period. This is also true when we control for the Cold
War period.
Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the intersection of two critical areas of interest for international relations
scholars: the role of leaders and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A burgeoning set of interna-
tional relations research demonstrates that leaders are not just black boxes who pursue policies due
to static conceptions of national interest and domestic political constraints. The beliefs of leaders
can play a significant role in driving national policy, especially on salient issues. According to most
theories of international relations and existing research on nuclear proliferation, however, it does
not matter who actually leads a given nation-state when it comes to nuclear proliferation dynamics.
We show, in contrast, that leaders with prior rebel backgrounds are particularly likely to pursue
nuclear weapons. Having participated in a struggle for independence against a foreign power or
a rebellion against the government, former rebels are particularly likely to seek absolute national
security in the form of nuclear weapons. Seeing nuclear weapons as invasion insurance and fearing
poorest country ever to initiate a nuclear weapons program: China in 1955.
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the loss of sovereignty, former rebels are much more likely to pursue the bomb than otherwise
similarly situated leaders. We show that this result does not just emerge from leaders in autocratic
regimes or those that take power after civil wars. Instead, former rebels are significantly more likely
to pursue nuclear weapons regardless of regime type. Moreover, the effect of former rebels on the
probability of proliferation is larger than many other traditional explanations, including economic
capacity and a state’s security environment. We therefore offer a novel theory of nuclear proliferation
that is robustly supported by the historical record. Our findings underscore the importance of future
research on the influence of leaders on proliferation.
One limitation of this study is that it does not reveal precisely why rebel experience raises the
risk of nuclear proliferation. We offered two mechanisms – one focusing on national independence
and the other on risk – that, in our view, drive the relationship examined in this article. Yet, due to
data restrictions, we cannot assess which of these mechanisms is most important. It is also possible
that there are other mechanisms that we did not identify.33 We leave these issues for future research.
Even without knowing exactly why rebel experience raises the risk of proliferation, this article shows
that leader backgrounds can usefully predict proliferation. Our study therefore has implications for
recent attempts to forecast international political events (Schrodt et al. 2011; Ward et al. 2013).
More generally, this paper demonstrates the viability of continuing research on how the back-
grounds of leaders may influence the way nations behave. Leaders can play a prominent role in
determining national policy, especially on issues of vital national importance such as the pursuit of
nuclear weapons. In addition, prior rebel experience appears related to several quantities of interest
for international relations scholars – further research on how prior rebel experience influences the
future beliefs of leaders and how this interacts with domestic political institutions is just one likely
area for development. Work in this area thus represents a fruitful path for future research with po-
tential applications not only for national security policy, but potentially for international economic
policy or even domestic policy issues as well.
33These issues are hardly unique to our study. When scholars discover new findings, the exact
reasons for an observed relationship are often unclear (e.g., Reiter & Stam 1998, 388).
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